

DRAFT:JABROSS:ag (19/3/65)

PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

I. Assumptions.

Set forth below are certain basic assumptions which condition the organizational proposals of this memorandum. These assumptions reflect experience with the administration of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) since 1956 and generally conform to the conclusions expressed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in its memorandum of 2 May 1964.

A. Scheduling and targetting of satellite and manned aircraft reconnaissance missions over denied areas is the responsibility of the DCI and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

B. The potentialities of U.S. technology must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to intelligence needs and objectives. In the development of new systems maximum use must be made of the experience, resources, facilities and technical competence of appropriate components of the Defense Department and CIA.

C. The national character of this essential intelligence enterprise must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the part of DoD, CIA and USIB.

D. A new organizational framework is required which, particularly in the field of satellite reconnaissance operations and systems development, will: (1) provide a clearly established delineation of the roles and responsibilities of components of the Government engaged in these activities, and (2) ensure effective coordination of these activities under centralized policy guidance and control.

II. Alternatives.

Alternative organizational proposals considered include:

A. Allocation of exclusive responsibility for the development and operation of satellite reconnaissance systems to: (1) an existing component of the Defense Department, or (2) CIA, or (3) some new agency to be created along the lines of NSA.

B. Authorization to CIA and to DoD and its components to continue independently the development and operation of satellite reconnaissance systems subject to arrangements for levying intelligence requirements, the exchange of information and provision of mutual support, with decisions concerning systems allocation and utilization to be made ad hoc by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI or the 303 Committee.

C. Establishment of an institutional basis for centralized control and direction of the program based on the Executive

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Committee consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI responsible for the formulation and communication of policy guidance, budgetary decisions and the broad allocation of program responsibility; (2) a Director of National Reconnaissance responsible for coordination of the entire program with staff responsibility for all components engaged in reconnaissance activities other than such elements of the Defense Department or the Armed Services as may be assigned to his direct supervision by the Secretary of Defense; and (3) a center responsible for the formulation and transmission of computerized guidance relating to the intelligence targets and objectives which determine the ephemeris of a mission.

III. Discussion of Alternatives.

A decision to assign exclusive control of operation and development of all satellite reconnaissance systems to the Defense Department would obviously be incompatible with the assumption that it is essential to preserve CIA's technical competence and experience as a contributing factor in the satellite program. Moreover, active participation by CIA in the research, development and production phases of satellite reconnaissance sensors would seem highly desirable for the purpose of ensuring that development or improvement of satellite payloads for

reconnaissance purposes is fully and exclusively responsive to intelligence needs.

Because of its charter responsibilities, CIA's participation in systems development serves as assurance that payloads will be designed to accommodate intelligence and only intelligence purposes.

Allocation of an exclusive franchise to CIA for all phases of satellite reconnaissance would provoke strong opposition, particularly on the theory that this would create a third agency in space with undesirable consequences. A decision giving CIA exclusive responsibility for payload development would deprive the program of resources under DoD control and eliminate desirable competition.

The proposal to create a new NSA-type organization offers few advantages. It would either involve the establishment within a new quasi-autonomous agency of all the facilities and authority necessary to carry out the reconnaissance program, such as launching, tracking, recovery, and other operational, procurement and R&D facilities including such jurisdictional responsibilities as those inherent in CIA's relations with foreign governments in connection with U-2 operations and the DCP's authority to expend unvouchered funds under Public Law 110. Or it would involve retention of some of these responsibilities and facilities in CIA and existing components of DoD. This alternative therefore either involves creation of a formidable new agency with far reaching jurisdictional implications in the space intelligence and

R&D fields. Or it would only serve to complicate rather than resolve the problem of achieving a coordinated program under centralized direction and control.

II Organizational Namebook:

A. The ~~Sec~~ Secretary of Defense ~~shall be the~~
Executive Agent for the National Reembursement
Program - ✓

The Executive Committee:
B. An Executive Committee, consisting of —



C. Director of National Reembursement:



D. Manning of the NRO -

To insure that the NRO is truly a national entity, it will be manned in a balanced manner by ~~the personnel from DoD~~ ^{Staff of} ~~of the Services, Civilian employees of the DoD~~ and CIA ~~personnel~~. An appropriate plan to ~~rotation of key positions~~ ^{transfer DoD & CIA personnel into key} positions of the NRO will be developed.

E. Paragraphs C, D & E (pages 3 through 7)

^{of the Principal features of the organization of the proposal}
Covering: C. Research & Preliminary Design

D. Systems Development

E. Routine Operational Phase

Set forth in the CIA proposal

Submitted to Sec Def under date of 30 March 1965,
are included in this proposal -